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ABSTRACT 
This article considers the impact of money market funds (MMFs) reforms in the US and the 
EU on the money market fund industry and global financial stability. The 2008 financial 
crisis proved that MMFs are a source of considerable instability to the global financial 
system, and highlighted their susceptibility to runs. The shareholders' incentive to redeem 
their shares before others do when there is a perception that the MMFs might suffer a loss 
makes MMFs vulnerable to runs. Given this reality, the article argues that the emphasis of the 
financial regulators on achieving the stability of the entire financial system after the 2008 
financial crisis necessitates the strictness of the new reforms. 
 
Divided into six parts, the article outlines the attributes and classification of MMFs, the 
definition of financial stability, and the run and systemic risk posed by MMFs during the 
financial crisis, before assessing the MMFs' reforms in the US and the EU and the impacts of 
these reforms on the MMFs industry and global financial stability system. The major 
component of the US reform is the introduction of the floating net asset value (FNAV), where 
an MMF’s share price will fluctuate to reflect the daily market value of the fund assets. In the 
EU the new regulation provides investors with a high degree of optionality for investing by 
introducing Low Volatility Net Asset Value (LVNAV) MMFs. The article concludes that 
despite that, the reforms are likely to jeopardize the viability of some categories of MMFs, 
they enhance global financial stability, and the complexity of the reforms has made MMFs 
more appropriate products to financial institutions’ investors than retail investors.   
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1. Introduction 
It has been a decade since the beginnings of the 2008 global financial crisis. This global crisis 
hit the US and EU financial markets and economy heavily and revealed many fragilities in the 
pre-crisis financial regulations. Money market funds (MMFs) were at the heart of the 2008 
financial crisis. MMFs are mutual funds whose main objectives are to maintain the principal 
value of the funds and offer a return in accordance with money market rates. They are an 
important source of short-term funding for corporations, governments, and financial 
institutions. The 2008 financial crisis highlighted the serious systemic risk and susceptibility 
of MMFs to runs. A run occurs when the value of an MMF's shares falls below their standard 
$1.00 or €1.00 value, so the shareholders "run" to the fund to redeem their shares and get the 
full value of their shares.1 Indeed, MMFs proved to be a significant source of instability to the 
global financial system. As explained below, in September 2008, the Reserve Primary Fund 
“broke the buck”, where the value of its shares fell below its standard $1, leading to heavy 
investor redemptions. This spread to other MMFs, resulting in a run on the MMF industry. 
Because of the run on the MMF industry, the impact MMFs have on the stability of the global 
financial system has received attention from financial regulators in the US and the EU. To 
preserve the stability of the financial system, it was essential to address the susceptibility of 
MMF to runs. Since the 2008 global financial crisis, MMFs have been the subject of ongoing 
and intensive regulatory debate. Determining the appropriate and final form of the reforms 
has been problematic because of the potential impact that the reforms might have on the 
commercial viability of these instruments. 
 
In the US, on July 23, 2014, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted a 
substantial reform to the regulatory framework governing MMFs. This reform is considered 
the most significant structural changes to MMFs in the US history. The reform came into 
force on October 2016. As discussed below, the main components of the reform are the 
introduction of the floating net assets value (FNAV), and the liquidity fees and redemption 
gates. 
 
In the EU, the new European MMFs regulation was published in the EU Official Journal on 
30 June 2017 and came into force on 21 July 2017. Existing MMFs will have to comply with 
                                                          
1 Mark Perlow, Money Market Funds - Preserving Systemic Benefits, Minimizing Systemic Risks 8 Berkeley Bus. 
L.J 80 (2011). 
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the new regulation by 21 January 2019. The EU reform follows the US reform in adoption of 
liquidity fees and redemption gate; however, the distinctive attribute of this reform is the 
introduction of Low Volatility NAV (LVNAV) MMFs. 
 
In the EU, the new reform has not been addressed yet, so this article takes the initiative in 
documenting and analysing the changes to the MMFs legal framework. In the US, the 
academic literature has largely focused on criticising the 2014 reform, arguing that the move 
from stable NAV to floating NAV and granting MMFs the authority to apply the liquidity fees 
and redemption gates threaten to destroy the value of this industry. For instance, Brown 
(2013) argued that the rules that were implemented by the SEC in 2010 had adequately 
strengthened the perceived weaknesses of the MMF industry, so the new rules proposed by 
the SEC were unnecessary.2 She found that extensive changes are likely to result in investor 
flight from the fund industry to other unregulated industries, thereby increasing systemic 
risks. In 2014, Peirce and Greene found that the proposed changes are not sufficient to address 
the vulnerabilities of MMFs to runs, so they discussed an alternative method that relies on the 
MMFs boards to freeze redemptions whenever and for as long they determine is in the best 
interests of the fund.3 Similarly, in 2015, Fisch criticised the 2014 reform and argued that 
mandatory sponsor support offers a novel and simple regulatory solution to MMF fragility.4 
Price, in 2015, examined the impact that the 2014 reform will have on the financial products 
industry, and specifically, on banks that offer money market deposit accounts. He concluded 
that the reform presents opportunities for banks to become an alternative investment vehicle 
to MMFs, and banks might serve as an alternative source of funding for entities which have 
typically relied on MMFs.5 
Reviewing the relevant academic literature shows that scholars have focused in their analysis 
of the new reform on the potential impact of the reform on the MMF industry without 
considering its core role in enhancing the stability of the financial system. In other words, 
scholars did not link the reform to any comprehensive reforms of the main components of the 
                                                          
2 Latoya Brown, The Regulation of U.S. Money Market Funds: Lessons from Europe 9 Int'l L. & Mgmt Rev 203 
(2013).  
3 See, Hester Peirce and Robert Greene, Opening the Gate to Money Market Fund Reform 34 Pace L. Rev. 
1093-1168 (2014).  
4 Jill Fisch, The Broken Buck Stops Here: Embracing Sponsor Support in Money Market Fund Reform 93 N.C. L. 
Rev. 979(2015).   
5 See, Carlton Price, What Money Market Mutual Fund Reform Means for Banks and Money Market Deposit 
Accounts 19 N.C. Banking Inst 257(2015).   
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financial system after the disastrous consequences of the 2008 financial crisis on the financial 
markets and the economy. 
 
In analysing and evaluating the US and EU reforms and their implications, this article makes 
a novel contribution by adopting a completely different approach that links MMFs' reforms to 
any broader plans to reform the financial system. This approach is essentially based on two 
main elements. The first element is the substantial change in financial regulations objectives 
after the global financial crisis 2008, where the goal of financial stability has become the 
dominate idea of national and international financial reforms. The second element is the shift 
from micro-prudential regulation policy to macro-prudential policy6, which fundamentally 
focuses on the resilience and robustness of the financial system as a whole rather than relying 
on individual institutions to secure the stability of the global financial system. The 
susceptibility of MMFs to runs proved to have such destabilizing implications for the whole 
financial system that reforming the financial system cannot be complete and efficient without 
addressing the risks posed by the structural vulnerabilities of MMFs, and this justifies the 
strictness of the new laws. It is worth mentioning that after the enforcement of the new reform 
in the US in 2016, no literature has been written about MMFs, so this article will benefit from 
the statistics published by the SEC and other relevant institutions after the enforcement to 
show the real impact of the new reform on the MMF industry. 
  
The remainder of the article is divided into five parts. First, because scholars do not make a 
clear differentiation between the different types of MMFs, this article attempts to clearly 
classify all types of MMFs in the US and the EU. To accomplish this Part 2 explains the 
nature, attributes and classifications of MMFs. Part 3 examines the concept of financial 
stability, and other relevant concepts such as systemic risk and the core components of the 
financial system, such as the financial institutions, markets and infrastructure that are 
necessarily a part of any stable system of finance. It also discusses the failure of Reserve 
Primary Fund and the phenomenon of runs in the MMF industry, highlighting how runs on 
MMFs differ from runs on banks and mutual funds. Part 4 evaluates the 2014 US reform, 
categorizing the changes into 4 main groups. It also scrutinizes the EU reform, comparing the 
EU regulators’ approach to address MMFs’ vulnerability to runs with the US approach. Part 5 
                                                          
6 The shift from micro-prudential regulation policy to macro-prudential policy will be discussed later (5. 
Analysing MMF’s Reforms from financial stability perspective). 
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analyses MMF’s reforms and their implications from financial stability perspective. Part 6 
concludes with practical recommendations to address certain gaps in the reforms.     
 
2. Background 
In order to understand MMFs’ reforms in the US and the EU and their impact on MMF 
industry, it is necessary to define MMFs and understand their structure, financial and 
economic attributes, and classification.  
 
2.1 Definition, Characteristics and Structure 
MMFs are a type of mutual fund that invest in short-term debt instruments.7 They are 
collective investment vehicles where money is raised by issuing shares or units to the public.8 
MMFs are open-ended funds where the funds undertake to buy back their shares or units on 
any regular business day.9 Thus, MMFs provide financing for financial institutions, 
corporations and governments. Further, MMFs typically invest in certificate of deposits (CD), 
commercial paper (CP), asset-backed commercial papers (ABCP), short-term bonds issued by 
private issuers, repurchase agreements, shares of (other) money market funds and government 
securities.10 MMFs diversify their investment portfolio to mitigate investment risks, so the 
impact of a decline in the value of one of the fund holdings is offset by the other holdings. 
The term “diversification” indicates the process of spreading risk over a number of different 
investments, and probably across different markets (reflecting the maxim that you should not 
put all your eggs in one basket).11 Moreover, MMFs are managed by competent managers 
(figure 1). Professional management means that the assets of an MMF are invested and 
managed by professional fund managers with the experience, resources and expertise to 
manage the fund effectively.12  
 
                                                          
7 Jonathan Lim, Untangling the Money Market Fund Problem: A Public-Private Liquidity Fund Proposal 19 Stan. 
J.L. Bus. & Fin 71 (2013). 
8 Nicholas Broke, Money Market Funds and Systemic Risk: A Critique of the SEC's 2014 Reforms 14 Geo. J.L. & 
Pub 290 (2016).  
9 See, Frank Fabozzi, Capital Markets: Institutions, Instruments, and Risk Management 648 (5th edn MIT Press, 
Cambridge 2015). 
10 See, Jeff Madura, Financial Markets and Institutions 627 (11th edn Cengage Learning, Stamford 2014). 
11 Charles Jones, Mutual Funds: Your Money, Your Choice: Take Control Now and Build Wealth Wisely 47 (FT 
Press, New Jersey 2003). 
12 John Haslem, Mutual Funds: Portfolio Structures, Analysis, Management, and Stewardship 43 (John Wiley & 
Sons, New Jersey 2009).  
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The nature and purpose of MMFs distinguish them from other financial services or market 
actors, including mutual funds and banks. Unlike mutual funds, whose NAV can fluctuate 
daily, MMFs seek to maintain a stable NAV, typically $1.00 per share in the US and €1 in 
the EU. This means mutual funds’ NAV fluctuates with the value of the assets in the fund's 
portfolio. The per share NAV of a mutual fund is the aggregate value of the fund assets 
minus the aggregate liabilities of the fund divided by the number of units outstanding.13 For 
instance: 
                                  The aggregate value of the assets £3,000,000 
                                   The aggregate liabilities         £400,000 
                                   The aggregate NAV               £2,600,000 
                                   Number of share outstanding   £1,000,000 
                                   Net asset value per share         £ 2.6 
 
Figure (1): MMF structure.  
 
                                                          
13 Herbert Mayo, Financial Institutions Investments and Management ) 337 (8thedn Thomson South- Western 
USA 2004. 
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In fact, MMFs’ ability to maintain a stable share price is considered the key reason for their 
popularity.14 Investors have often viewed MMFs as bank equivalents and invest their money 
in MMFs because MMFs offer features analogous to bank deposits: stability of value of the 
principal invested and instantaneous access to liquidity.15 Although banks and MMFs are 
similar in some respects they differ in others, especially in terms of their legal structure and 
economic function. MMFs do not create liquidity for their investors, rather they manage 
liquidity by investing in short-term debt instruments.16 Banks are deemed highly leveraged 
institutions and use borrowed funds to provide credit to individuals and businesses needing 
access to credit17 and use borrowed funds to provide credit to individuals and businesses 
needing access to credit.18 Further, MMFs regulations clearly specify the types and 
proportions of the assets that MMFs can invest in, and the investors have the right to know the 
funds’ holdings through the compulsory disclosure which is not the case for the bank 
                                                          
14 See, Fabozzi, (n 9) 648. 
15 See, Qingmin Yan and Jianhua, Regulating China's shadow banks 2 (Routledge, New York 2015). 
16 Fernando J. Cardim de Carvalho, Liquidity Preference and Monetary Economies 89 (Routledge, New York 
2015). 
17 See, Investment Company Institute, Money Market Funds in 2012: Money Market Funds Are Not Banks 
(2012) available at https://www.ici.org/pdf/12_mmf_mmfs_are_not_banks.pdf accessed 5 August 2017. 
18 See, Ross Cranston, Principles of Banking Law 5 (3rd edn, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2018).  
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depositors.19 Banks typically hold short-term and long-term securities which are illiquid. 
Holding illiquid long-term and non-diversified portfolios has demonstrably failed to provide 
stability for the banking industry.20 On the contrary, MMFs hold short-term highly liquid, safe 
and transparent securities. Another significant difference is that the notion of MMFs is based 
on the idea of pooling money from investors by offering their shares to the public. This means 
that unlike bank depositors, MMFs’ investors buy shares from the funds and do not deposit 
their money. Therefore, investors acquire ownership interests in the fund's assets and shares in 
the fund’s profits and losses.  
 
It is significant to mention that due to their popularity in the financial markets, MMFs assets 
have grown dramatically over time. One of the main reasons of this growth is that MMFs 
offer higher yield relative to banks’ savings accounts.21 The global MMF industry (measured 
by assets under management) is dominated by the U.S. In Europe, more than 95% of the 
MMFs industry is concentrated in Luxembourg, Ireland and France.22 In its first quarter 2017 
report, the Investment Company Institute reported that assets in MMFs had reached nearly 
$5,157 billion during the first quarter of 2017 compared to $42.77 trillion of the mutual funds 
worldwide assets at the end of the first quarter of 2017.23 This means that MMFs accounted 
for an estimated 12% of all mutual funds globally. In the US, according to the American 
Investment Company Institute Fact Book 2017, MMFs net assets exceeded $2.7 trillion at the 
end of 2016.24  
 
2.2 A Classification of Money Market Funds   
Different types of MMFS around the world exists to cater to the investors’ needs such as risk 
tolerance and returns expectations. This flexibility makes MMFs a preferred option to a wide 
range of investors in the financial market. Since this paper addresses MMFs in the US and the 
EU, the focus will be on the classification of MMFs in these jurisdictions. As mentioned 
                                                          
19 See, Jones, (n 11) 47. 
20 See, Investment Company Institute (n 17). 
21 See, International Monetary Fund, Global Financial Stability Report, March 2002: Market Developments and 
Issues 46 (2002).   
22 See, IOSCO, Peer Review of Regulation of Money Market Funds: Final Report (2015) available at 
https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD502.pdf accessed 6 August 2017.   
23 See, Investment Company Institute, Worldwide Assets and Flows for Regulated Open-End Funds First 
Quarter 2017 available at https://www.ici.org/research/stats/worldwide/ww_q1_17 accessed 6 August 2017.   
24 See, American Investment Company Institute, 2017 Investment Company Fact Book (57th Edition, 2017). The 
American Investment Company Institute (ICI) publishes every year a Fact Book which updates the statistics of 
the mutual funds industry in the USA and around the world. 
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above, there is no clear classification of MMFs, so this article strives to distinctly classify 
them. Based on assets valuation methodology, MMFs can be classified into constant (or 
stable) NAV MMFs and variable NAV MMFs. They can also be classified by the investor 
type into two types: institutional and retail MMFs. According to their portfolio investments, 
MMFs can be classified into government and prime MMFs. This section investigates these 
types and their fundamental features (figure 2).  
Figure (2): types of MMFs  
 
A- Constant Versus Variable MMFs 
Depending on the assets valuation methodology applied, MMFs either offer their shares at a 
constant net asset value (CNAV) or a variable or floating net asset value (VNAV).25 CNAV 
MMFs use amortized cost accounting method to value their assets.26 Amortized cost method 
is an accounting valuation method where securities are valued at acquisition cost, as adjusted 
for amortization of premium or accretion of discount.27 This means that the valuation is not 
based on current market factors. Using this method enables MMFs to maintain a constant 
share price of $1, €1 or £1. By using the amortized cost method, the MMF makes incremental 
adjustments to the amortized cost of a security each business day, so the amortized cost of 
that security equals its face value when the security matures. For example, MMFs invest in 
short-term securities such as commercial paper and repurchase agreements. Most of these 
                                                          
25 CNAV is also called Stable NAV (SNAV) and VNAV is also called Floating NAV (FNAV).  
26  Daniel Levin, Breaking the Buck: The End for Money Market Mutual Funds as We Know Them 28 Rev. 
Banking & Fin. L 751 (2009).   
27 Lim, (n 7).  
Types of MMFs
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securities are discount securities where they are typically sold for less than face value (the 
discount). Discount securities do not pay explicit interest, rather the interest is implicit.28 
When the securities mature, the investor receives the face value. The difference between what 
the investor paid and the amount received at maturity is the implicit interest. For instance, an 
MMF may pay € 99.50 for a security that will return €100 in 50 days. The face value of the 
security is €100 and the purchase price of the security is € 99.50. The discount is € 0.50. The 
MMF records the security in its portfolio at an initial amortized cost of € 99.50. By applying 
the amortized cost method, the MMF can increase the amortized cost value of the security 
each business day by the amount of the daily interest accrual. This is generally calculated as 
the difference between the security face value and the purchase price divided by the 
remaining maturity of the security. In our example, the daily accrued interest would be one 
cent ([€100 - €99.50]/50). The amortized cost method allows MMFs to increase the 
amortized cost of securities—the purchase price plus accrued interest— at a predictable rate 
each business day.29 Consequently, a money market fund can maintain a stable €1.00/$ 1.00 
NAV. The accrued interest, in our example the daily one cent increment, is the daily dividend 
declared to the MMF shareholders. When the accrued interest is offset by the dividend paid to 
the shareholders, the MMF manages, from day to day, to maintain a stable NAV. 
Obviously, the rationale of permitting MMFs to use the amortized cost method lies in the 
nature of the securities that MMFs are required to hold. As mentioned above, MMFs hold 
short-term and highly liquid debt securities. The amortized cost method usually provides a 
good approximation to the real market value of MMF portfolio assets. That could only be true 
if financial market conditions remain exactly as they were when the MMF purchased the 
security because both the security’s amortized cost and its market value increase every 
business day by the amount of interest accrued. Nonetheless, it is rare that financial market 
conditions remain the same. For instance, interest rates change from day to day and that 
might affect the market values of the securities that an MMF holds. Therefore, MMFs value 
                                                          
28 For further information about discount securities see, Julian Walmsley, The Foreign Exchange and Money 
Markets Guide 147 (2nd edn John Wiley & Sons, New Jersey 2000). 
29 See, Institutional Money Market Funds Association, The use of amortised cost accounting by money market 
funds (2013) available at 
https://www.immfa.org/assets/files/IMMFA%20The%20use%20of%20amortised%20cost%20accounting%20b
y%20MMF.pdf accessed 17 August 2017.  
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their securities at amortized cost to avoid fluctuations in the market value in the interim and 
maintain a stable NAV.30 
VNAV MMFs, on the other hand, use the mark-to-market accounting method to value their 
portfolio. The mark-to-market method is a valuation method where securities are valued at 
their current market value in order to reflect the regular fluctuations in the value of the 
MMF's portfolio assets.31 Therefore, the MMF's NAV might float from day to day. For 
instance, if an MMF invests its entire portfolio assets in A's company shares, at the close of 
each business day the MMF manager computes the fund's NAV by multiplying the closing 
value of the A share price by the number of the MMF's A shares. When there is no readily 
available market quotation for entire or some of the MMF's securities the MMF manager uses 
the fair valuation method to value those securities.32 The fair value is the price that the MMF 
may reasonably expect to receive upon a current sale. The main objective of the mark-to-
market method is to compute a timely and accurate value of the MMF's assets.  
It is important to know that prior to the 2014 reform, CNAV MMF was the only type of 
MMFs in the US.33 In Europe, MMFs could feature either CNAV or VNAV; however, the 
new MMF reforms, as will be discussed later, have produced a new type of MMF: the low 
volatility MMF (LVNAV). 
B- Institutional Versus Retail MMFs 
MMFs can be classified by the targeted investor group into retail and institutional. A retail 
MMF usually designs its policies and procedures to limit the ownership to natural persons. 
An institutional MMF is a fund that targets institutional and sophisticated investors.34 
Institutional investors use money market funds to manage liquidity and these act as important 
alternatives to cash accounts. On aggregate, institutional investors account for around 65 per 
cent of the total assets under management in the US MMF industry.35 In Europe, MMFs are 
widely used by institutional investors at approximately 75 per cent of the total asset under 
                                                          
30 Brown, (n 2). 
31 William Birdthistle, Breaking Bucks in Money Market Funds 2010 Wis. L. Rev 1165 (2010). 
32 Levin, (n 26).    
33 Brown, (n 2). 
34 Robert Pozen and Theresa Hamacher, The Fund Industry: How Your Money is Managed 203 (2nd edn John 
Wiley & Sons, New Jersey 2015).  
35 See, American Investment Company Institute, (n 24).  
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management.36 The significance of classifying MMFs into institutional and retail derives 
from the differences in shareholder behaviour, especially in difficult situations in the 
financial market. Retail investors are presumed to be passive investors which means that in 
the case of any potential change in the risk characteristics of the MMF retail investors react 
slowly to that risk.37 Institutional investors, on the other hand, are sophisticated investors, and 
because they have their own experienced research team, they react quickly to any potential 
risk.38 This exposes MMFs to different degrees of liquidity risk. The degree of the risk might 
be greater when the MMFs assets are owned by fewer large sophisticated investors. 
Therefore, institutional investor-oriented MMFs preserve a high level of available liquidity to 
avoid the risk of investor run, which in turn might affect the stability of the financial market 
generally and the MMFs particularly.  
C- Government Versus Prime MMFs 
A prime MMF is a fund that invests in securities issued by corporate entities. Prime MMFs 
typically invest in short-term corporate notes, repurchase agreement, banks’ certificates of 
deposits and commercial paper.39 MMFs that invest in securities issued or guaranteed by state 
governments are known as government MMFs.40 Government and prime MMFs can be found 
in both the US and Europe. Because government MMFs principally invest in government 
securities, they are not exposed to credit risk. Therefore, unlike prime MMF, they are 
considered safe investments. It is significant to know that in the US the MMF industry has 
produced another type of MMF: a tax-exempt MMF. This fund invests exclusively in 
securities issued by the US local governments and tax-exempt municipal securities.41 A tax-
exempt MMF is a good option for retail investors who are seeking a tax-exempt investment 
to their income; however, a tax-exempt MMF is the smallest MMF category regarding the 
size of the assets under management.   
3. MMFs and Financial Stability  
                                                          
36 See, Institutional Money Market Funds Association IMMFA Assets Under Management (2017) available at 
https://www.immfa.org/market-statistics/immfa-aum.html accessed 17 August 2017.    
37 Jorge A Chan-Lau and Li L Ong, U.S. Mutual Fund Retail Investors in International Equity Markets: Is the Tail 
Wagging the Dog? (2005) International Monetary Fund Working Paper 05/162, 3 
http://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2016/12/31/U-S-18227 accessed 22 March 2018.  
38 Jason Kravitt, Securitization of Financial Assets 17-112 (Aspen Publishers Online, 2012). 
39 Birdthistle, (n 31). 
  
40 Pozen and Hamacher, (n 34) 203.   
41 Lim, (n 7). 
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This section is divided into two parts. While the first part defines financial stability, the 
second part discusses financial instability caused by MMFs runs during the 2008 financial 
crisis. 
3. 1 Defining Financial Stability 
Since this article analyses MMFs' reforms from a financial stability perspective, it is essential 
to examine the concept of financial stability and define its core elements. However, before 
examining financial stability, it is useful to appropriately define the relevant concepts such as 
the financial system, and systemic risk.  
What is a financial system? 
Generally, a financial system comprises of three main components: financial institutions, 
financial markets, and financial infrastructure.42 Financial institutions, such as pension funds 
and mutual funds, also provide a wide range of services, including investment and market 
brokering. A financial market is a platform that matches savers and investors under some 
established rules of conduct.43 Financial infrastructure consists of set of institutions that 
enable efficient operation of financial intermediaries such as payment systems and credit 
information offices.44  
What is systemic risk? 
Despite the fact the term “Systemic risk” is widely used, it is difficult to define and quantify.45 
In its Report on financial consolidation and risk, the Group of Ten (G-10) proposed the 
following definition: 
“Systemic financial risk is the risk that an event will trigger a loss of 
economic value or confidence in, and attendant increases in uncertainly 
about, a substantial portion of the financial system that is serious enough 
to quite probably have significant adverse effects on the real economy.”46 
                                                          
42 International Monetary Fund, Compilation Guide on Financial Soundness Indicators (2004) available at 
https://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/fsi/eng/2004/guide/index.htm accessed 20 June 2018.   
43 See, Madura, (n 10) 3. 
44 Garry Schinasi, Safeguarding Financial Stability: Theory and Practice 107 (International Monetary Fund, 
washington 2006). 
45 International Monetary Fund, Responding to the Financial Crisis and Measuring Systemic Risks (2009) 
available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2009/01/ accessed 20 June 2018.    
46 Group of Ten, Report on Consolidation in the Financial Sector (2001) available at 
https://www.bis.org/publ/gten05.pdf accessed 20 June 2018.    
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The definition shows the key characteristics of systemic risk. Systemic risk must affect a 
“substantial portion” of the financial system, so it is a risk to the financial system as a whole. 
What is financial stability?  
Despite the increased focus on the significance of financial stability issues, there is, as yet, no 
widely accepted agreement on what financial stability precisely means. In the financial 
stability literature, two schools of thought are distinctly discernible. While the first school 
prefers to define financial instability, the representatives of the second school attempt to 
define financial stability.  
In the first school of thought, Mishkin, for example, stated that “financial instability occurs 
when shocks to the financial system interfere with information flow so that the financial 
system can no longer do its job of channeling funds to those with productive investment 
opportunities”.47 The definition emphasizes the essential role of information failures in 
causing financial instability. Further, Chant described financial instability as “…conditions in 
financial markets that harm or threaten to harm an economy’s performance through their 
impact on the working of the financial system” The definition suggests that financial 
instability should be examined with regard to the potential impact of changes in financial 
conditions on the real economy.48 
In the second school of thought, Crockett pointed out that financial stability requires “that the 
key institutions in the financial system are stable, in that there is a high degree of confidence 
that they continue to meet their contractual obligations without interruption or outside 
assistance; and that the key markets are stable...”.49 The definition considers only two 
components of the financial system: financial institutions and markets. Nonetheless, it does 
not include the third main element of the financial system which is financial infrastructure.  
In his paper "Defining Financial Stability", Schinasi defined financial stability as “A financial 
system is in a range of stability whenever it is capable of facilitating (rather than impeding) 
the performance of an economy and of dissipating financial imbalances that arise 
                                                          
47 Frederic  Mishkin, Global Financial Instability: Framework, Events, Issues 13 Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 7 (1999.  
48 John Chant, Financial Stability as a Policy Goal 3 (2003) in Essays on Financial Stability, Technical Report No. 
95, Bank of Canada, available at 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.172.8150&rep=rep1&type=pdf accessed 19 June 
2018.  
49 Andrew Crockett, Why is Financial Stability a Goal of Public Policy? 82 Economic Review 6 (1997). 
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endogenously or as a result of significant adverse and unanticipated events”.50 Interestingly, 
the definition does not view financial stability as a single or static condition but instead it 
emphasizes that financial stability is a continuum. 
In 2012, the European Central Bank (ECB) defined financial stability as: 
"a condition in which the financial system—comprising of financial 
intermediaries, markets and market infrastructures—is capable of 
withstanding shocks and the unraveling of financial imbalances, 
thereby mitigating the likelihood of disruptions in the financial 
intermediation process which are severe enough to significantly 
impair the allocation of savings to profitable investment 
opportunities".51  
The ECB definition is significant because it emphasizes that financial stability is a broad 
concept, encompassing the three core components of the financial system: financial 
institutions, markets and infrastructure. Considering the close interlinkages between all of 
these components, expectations of disturbances in any of the individual elements can impact 
the overall stability. To illustrate, disturbances may initially arise and develop in a single 
institution and subsequently spread to other elements of the financial system. Therefore, the 
regulatory intervention to achieve financial stability should be comprehensive, addressing the 
three key components. Leaving any gap in these elements will result in the instability of the 
financial system. This approach is called the macro-prudential approach. In the aftermath of 
the 2008 financial crisis, there seems to be a consensus among regulators and academics that 
financial regulation needs to follow the macro-prudential approach. In analysing MMFs' 
reforms in the EU and the US, this article will apply this holistic approach. The events during 
the 2008 financial crisis demonstrated that the vulnerability of MMFs to runs is a source of 
instability of the whole financial system, so any attempt to stabilize the financial system will 
most likely be incomplete without addressing this susceptibility.   
3.2 The 2008 Financial Crisis: Breaking the Buck and the Phenomenon of Runs 
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51 European Central Bank, Financial Stability Review (2012) available at 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/financialstabilityreview201212en.pdf?f73875a2aa7884337314f4f1
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The financial crisis of 2008, often referred to as the Great Recession, affected every single 
aspect of the economy. The September 2008 run on some MMFs alerted financial regulators 
to the systemic relevance of MMFs. Even though MMFs did not cause the financial crisis, 
their performance during the crisis demonstrated their potential to spread or even expand a 
crisis.52 An MMF "breaks the buck" when the value of its shares falls below their standard 
$1.00 or €1.00 value. This could occur when the number of shares redeemed in a short period 
of time is huge, so the liquidity of the fund cannot support the $1.00 valuation.53 In this case, 
MMF's shareholders are not able to redeem their shares for the $1.00 that they primarily 
invested, so they "run" to the MMF to redeem their shares. A run on an MMF could cause 
contagion in the MMF industry where a wave of redemptions spread from one MMF to 
another.54 In US history, only two MMFs have broken the buck where their NAV fell below 
$1.00.55 The most recent example was in 2008 when the Reserve Primary Fund reduced the 
NAV of its shares to $0.97.56 The Reserve Primary Fund was one of the largest MMF in the 
US and had a good reputation among the investors because it generated above average 
returns. Interestingly, the Reserve Primary Fund increased its commercial paper holdings by 
59% within one year. Reserve Primary Fund assets under management were $62 billion, of 
which it had invested around 1.2%, $785 million, in commercial paper issued by Lehman 
Brothers.57 On September 16, 2008, Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc declared bankruptcy. 
Consequently, the Reserve Primary Fund lost $785 million in value, and that caused a 
decrease in its NAV per share from $1.00 to $0.97. One day later, Reserve Primary Fund 
broke the buck leading to a run by its shareholders. The shareholders requested redemptions 
of approximately $40 billion in just two days.58 The run contagion quickly spread to other 
prime MMFs and within one-week investors withdrew approximately $310 billion from 
prime MMFs.59 In order to meet investors' redemption requests, MMFs were forced to sell 
their portfolio securities, which in turn lead to declines in the prices of short-term 
instruments. However, only the Reserve Primary Fund broke the buck because many MMF 
                                                          
52 See, Viral V. Acharya, Thomas F. Cooley, Matthew P. Richardson and Ingo Walter, Regulating Wall 
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sponsors provided fundamental financial support to avoid breaking the buck (sponsor support 
will be discussed in detail later).60   
Further, in order to understand MMFs runs it is necessary to compare MMFs with banks and 
mutual funds. The phenomenon of runs is commonly associated with the banking industry.61 
The main source of funds for banks is deposits; money that depositors deposit to the bank for 
safekeeping and use in their transactions. The depositors reserve the right to withdraw the full 
amount of their deposits upon demand. Banks use deposits to lend borrowers. Banks usually 
have liquidity to meet normal withdrawal demands. Nonetheless, if a large quantity of 
depositors withdraw their money at the same time, the bank will not be able to honour its 
obligation and meet those demands.62 And as a result, the bank will experience a run. The 
depositors who withdraw their money first are able to receive their deposit in full, while those 
who run slowly to the bank will most likely not receive their full deposits. This is known as 
the first-mover advantage.63 In contrast, a “first-mover advantage” in MMFs enables those 
investors who redeem their shares first to do so at the standard NAV share price of $1.00, 
even if the fund’s assets are worth less. The redemption at $1.00 will decrease the MMF’s 
assets because those investors receive more than their actual entitlement. Consequently, the 
subsequent investors will receive less than the first movers. Here, it is important to emphasise 
the fact that in normal market conditions small variations between the standard $1.00 and the 
MMF’s actual NAV do not result in decreasing the MMF's assets because these variations are 
offset by the purchases that also take place at $1.00 per share at the same time. 
In a mutual fund, the first-mover advantage is not possible because the mutual fund does not 
undertake to pay out anything more than each share's NAV which represents the aggregate 
value of the fund assets minus the aggregate liabilities of the fund divided by the number of 
shares outstanding.64 To illustrate, if a mutual fund's NAV dropped by 20 per cent the 
shareholders who run first to the fund will receive the same as those who ask for redemption 
later. In other words, each shareholder in the mutual fund would receive only 80 percent of 
the original invested value. Thus, the phenomenon of run in mutual funds is not possible. 
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In addition, breaking the buck might have serious and harmful impacts not only on the 
investors, but also on the MMF industry and the financial market. To explain the threat, when 
an MMF breaks the buck some investors might lose part or all of their share value. The 
impact would be bigger on institutional investors because they usually hold large quantities 
of shares and some MMFs shares might be held by few institutional investors. Further, 
breaking the buck could also have a serious impact on the MMF industry. An MMF promise 
to redeem its shares at stable $1.00 NAV per share is a main attribute that encourages 
investors to invest in the fund. Failure of an MMF to honour its promise could result in losing 
the confidence of not only the investors of the fund that broke the buck but also other MMFs 
investors, so they either withdraw their money or stop investing in MMFs in the future. This 
impact was clearly demonstrated by the huge number of redemptions that took place when 
the Reserve Primary Fund broke the buck in both the US and European financial markets. 
According to the Institutional Money Market Funds Association (IMMFA) the huge number 
of redemptions in the US MMFs market affected the European CNAV MMFs to such an 
extent that around 25 per cent of their total assets were redeemed in a very short time 
period.65   
 Moreover, the adverse impact of breaking the buck could extend to the financial market and 
economy. As explained above, when an MMF breaks the buck its investors will quickly run 
to the fund to redeem their shares. A run on an MMF could lead to runs on other MMFs and 
the huge number of redemptions will cause liquidity problems to MMFs. To overcome these 
problems, MMFs will attempt to sell their portfolio assets to get cash. A forced sale of the 
MMFs assets that occurs simultaneously might lead to price declines in the market or in a 
specific sector. This most likely will affect all other institutions that hold these assets and 
ultimately the stability of the financial market. The interventions of the US government to 
stabilise the financial market after the Reserve Primary Fund broke the buck is clear proof of 
this potential impact. To illustrate, on September 19, 2008, the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System and the Treasury launched two unprecedented market interventions 
to provide additional liquidity to MMFs and stabilize the financial markets.66 These programs 
successfully slowed the run on prime MMFs. Although the government interventions were 
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vital at that stage, the financial crisis alerted the financial regulators to the necessity of 
reforming the MMFs' regulations as a prerequisite to stabilising the financial market. 
4. Regulatory reform of MMFs 
After the global financial crisis, there was a consensus that the financial market’s instability 
was global, and international cooperation to enhance the financial legal framework needed to 
be strengthened. Under the guidance of the Financial Stability Board (FSB), some initiatives 
to improve financial stability were made, including recommendations to promote oversight of 
shadow banking activities, the Basel III Accords and certain provisions for the “globally 
systemic important banks”.67 Along with securitization and repurchase agreement, improving 
MMFs’ regulatory framework is considered an essential part of enhancing the shadow 
banking system. The FSB, in 2011, defined shadow banking as “credit intermediation 
involving entities and activities (fully or partially) outside the regular banking system.”68 The 
FSB tasked the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) to develop 
guidelines for MMFs and on October 9, 2012, the IOSCO issued their Policy 
Recommendations (Final Report) for reforming MMFs.69 The IOSCO Report outlined 15 
recommendations to be the basis for common standards for MMFs regulations across 
jurisdictions. The recommendations, generally, are articulated around key principles for 
disclosure to investors, liquidity management, maturity, credit, valuation, use of ratings and 
repurchase agreements. The IOSCO recommended that: MMFs should be explicitly defined 
in collective investment scheme regulations; specific limitations on the types of assets in 
which MMFs could invest and the risks they may take should be applied; regulators should 
closely monitor other collective investment schemes and securities similar to MMFs to avoid 
confusion among investors and to limit the risk of regulatory arbitrage; they should comply 
with fair valuation methods when valuing the securities; the appropriateness of the MMF 
valuation practices should be reviewed by a third party; MMFs should know their investors 
and their sophistication as part of risk management; they should hold a minimum amount of 
liquid assets to strengthen themselves against huge redemptions and prevent forced sales; 
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they should periodically conduct appropriate stress testing; they should have appropriate tools 
to deal with exceptional market conditions and substantial redemption pressures; 
stable/constant NAV MMFs should be converted to floating/variable NAV or, alternatively 
stable NAV MMFs should be reinforced for resilience; MMFs should have in place effective 
internal credit risk assessment procedures to avoid any mechanistic reliance on external 
ratings agencies; the credit rating agencies' current rating methodologies should be more 
explicit for MMFs; MMFs' investors should be informed the possibility of principal loss and 
that MMFs do not guarantee capital; MMFs should disclose the funds’ practices in relation to 
valuation and the applicable procedures in times of stress; and regulators should develop 
guidelines on the  framework applicable to the use of repos by MMFs.70 The FSB endorsed 
IOSCO’s recommendations, and published its final report, Strengthening Oversight and 
Regulation of Shadow Banking.71 The IOSCO’s recommendations, obviously, demonstrate 
the role of improving MMFs legal framework in achieving the stability of the international 
financial system because they aim to reinforce the safety of MMFs and reduce their potential 
to create or amplify systemic risks. The importance of these recommendations comes from 
the fact that they recognize that MMFs operate differently from country to country under 
different market regulations, so regulators can determine the appropriate policy responses to 
address the financial stability issues potentially raised by these financial institutions. 
4.1 Reforms in the U.S. Regulatory Regime 
In the US, MMFs are a type of mutual fund registered under the Investment Company Act 
(ICA) of 1940. What makes MMFs unique relative to other mutual funds is that MMFs must 
comply with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 2a-7.72 In 1983, the SEC 
issued Rule 2a-7 that sets out portfolio requirements regarding liquidity, maturity, credit 
quality and diversification which were intended to help MMFs to maintain a stable NAV. In 
response to the 2008 financial crisis and breaking of the buck by the Reserve Primary Fund, 
the SEC adopted reforms and amendments to Rule 2a-7 in 2010.73 These reforms were 
designed to fortify the MMFs industry and protect investors by reducing the interest rate, 
liquidity and credit risks of MMF's portfolios. To illustrate, the reforms required MMFs to 
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maintain daily at least 10 percent of an MMF’s assets, and weekly, at least 30 percent of each 
MMF’s assets, liquidity.74 MMFs became also under an obligation to reduce the maximum 
allowable weighted average maturity (WAM) of MMF portfolios from 90 days to 60 days in 
order to diminish MMFs’ exposure to interest rate risk.75 Another important change was that 
MMFs' advisers were required to periodically stress test their funds’ ability to maintain a 
stable NAV per share based on certain hypothetical events such as a change in short-term 
interest rates. Although the 2010 MMF reforms were an effective improvement to the MFF 
industry, several significant market events after the 2010 reforms, however, raised a 
fundamental question about the demand for further reforms to boost the financial stability and 
reduce MMFs systemic risks. Particularly, in 2011, the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis and 
the US. government’s debt ceiling crisis occurred, and in 2013 another US. government debt 
ceiling unfolded.  
In fact, after the 2010 reforms there have been no failures in the MMF industry despite the 
significant turmoil in the financial markets. In 2011, during the Eurozone crisis and the 
United States debt ceiling MMFs were able to meet investors’ heavy redemption requests.76 
This can be attributed to the high level of liquidity that MMFs were required to hold under 
the 2010 rules and the MMFs managers’ anticipation to investors' response to the crisis, so 
they responded quickly to the market conditions by increasing the fund’s liquidity. However, 
the investors’ confidence in the MMFs industry was once again faltering and consequently a 
debate for further MMF reforms emerged. Importantly, when the SEC adopted the 2010 
amendments, it stated that MMFs’ experience during the 2008 financial crisis raised 
questions of whether more substantial changes to MMFs regulations might be warranted.77 
Further, data and analysis from the SEC’s Division of Economic and Risk Analysis (DERA) 
showed that additional reforms would assist in addressing potential future failures in the 
MMF industry.78      
It is significant to know that in 2010, under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act) the Financial Stability Oversight 
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Council (FSOC) was created.79 The creation of FSOC was to identify risks to US financial 
stability, respond to potential threats to the stability of the US financial system and promote 
market discipline. Under Section 120 of the Dodd-Frank Act the FSOC has the authority to 
issue "recommendations" to a primary financial regulator to apply new or strengthen existing 
standards and safeguards.80 In 2012, the FSOC used this authority and initiated a proceeding 
pressing the SEC to adopt new MMF rules.81 Even though the FSOC has the authority to 
make recommendations, the SEC, a primary regulator, may reject the FSOC's 
recommendation and explain its reasons. The FSOC could not force the SEC to start the 
reform process; however, the SEC was under a pressure to show that it can act on its own to 
address all concerns on MMFs caused by the market crisis.82 On June 5, 2013, by a 
unanimous vote, the SEC proposed amendments to the MMFs regulation. The proposed 
amendments designed to address MMFs' vulnerability to heavy redemptions and mitigate 
potential contagion from such redemptions. On July 23, 2014, the SEC voted 3–2 to 
substantially amend the regulatory framework of MMFs. The 2014 reform is one of the 
biggest structural changes to MMFs in the US history, changing Rule 2a-7 radically. The new 
rules came into force on October 2016. The 2014 reform rules can be grouped into four 
categories: (A) rules regarding trading certain MMFs at floating NAV (FNAV); (B) a 
requirement to impose liquidity fees and redemption gates; (C) rules regarding disclosure and 
reporting obligations; and (D) stress testing. The following analysis will investigate the 
rationale behind the new rules and their impacts on the MMFs industry and the stability of the 
financial market. 
A- Floating NAV 
The major component of 2014 MMF reform is the FNAV. The 2014 reform requires 
institutional prime and institutional municipal MMFs to value their portfolio securities using 
market-based factors.83 This means that these MMFs are no longer permitted to use the 
amortized cost method to compute their NAV. Government and retail MMFs are allowed to 
continue using the amortized cost method to value their securities in order to maintain a 
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stable NAV. A government MMF is defined as a fund that invests 99.5% or more of their 
total assets in cash, government securities, and/or repurchase agreements that are 
collateralized fully (collateralized by cash or government securities).84 A retail MMF is 
defined as an MMF with policies and procedures reasonably designed to limit all beneficial 
owners of the fund to natural persons.85 The floating NAV eliminates the most unique 
attribute of an MMF, the stable NAV, which makes MMFs attractive vehicles to different 
types of investors. This raises a significant question: why might the SEC risk destroying an 
essential part of an industry, which has performed very well in the financial markets and 
served different types of investors? In order to understand the rationale behind the SEC's 
decision to shift from stable NAV (SNAV) to FNAV it is essential to link the MMF 2014 
reform with the central objective of the financial regulation -financial stability- after the 2008 
financial crisis. Since the 2008 financial crisis the stability of the financial system has 
become the priority of the financial regulators. Because of the social and economic costs of 
financial instability, the reforms that have addressed the main financial industries such as the 
banking industry (Basel III) demonstrate the emphasis on the importance of financial 
stability. As discussed earlier, MMF industry is a significant industry and achieving the 
financial stability objective cannot be accomplished without removing the instability 
elements in this industry because any failure in the MMF sector will likely have wider impact 
on other sectors. To illustrate, during the 2008 financial crisis and the subsequent events in 
2011, institutional prime MMFs received huge redemption requests and were more 
susceptible to runs than any other types due to the sophistication of their investors.86 
Therefore, the SEC looks at institutional prime MMFs as a main source of vulnerability, but 
can FNAVs address the susceptibility of institutional prime MMFs to run? 
An FNAV is essentially the SEC’s attempt to reduce the first mover advantage associated 
with the structure of a SNAV because an MMF will redeem its shares at the fund’s true NAV. 
This means that institutional prime MMFs will operate like all other types of mutual funds 
that use the mark-to-market method to price their shares. In transacting with an FNAV, 
institutional prime MMFs' investors should be aware when making the investment decision 
that institutional prime MMFs are not anymore risk-free investments and their shares' prices 
might be affected by the market’s conditions. Although the SEC's approach to addressing 
institutional prime MMFs runs might mitigate the first mover advantage associated with the 
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motivation to run, it is unlikely to be sufficient to prevent a run during a severe liquidity crisis 
because FNAVs would not prevent MMF investors from acting rationally to protect their 
investments in any crisis. This can be demonstrated by the performance of FNAV MMFs in 
Europe during the 2008 financial crisis where both FNAV and CNAV MMFs were equally 
likely to run.87 However, it is significant to emphasise that FNAV reform works in line with 
other 2014 amendments, redemption gate and liquidity fee, which aim to address MMFs 
vulnerability to run. 
Importantly, the major change in the institutional prime MMF structure has adverse 
consequences on this important MMF's segment. Institutional Prime MMFs’ transition from 
stable to floating NAV might cause large shifts in assets to other investments such as 
unregulated or less regulated funds, offshore MMFs or banks. Corporate cash managers, for 
example, might shift their assets to other risk-free investments because their investment 
policies and guidelines prevent them from investing in FNAV MMFs. According to Goldman 
Sachs Asset Management, from 2014 to 2016, institutional prime MMFs' assets under 
management dropped from $1 trillion to $125 billion.88 This huge shift in institutional prime 
MMFs assets means that the 2014 reforms have significantly affected these MMFs, so they 
have become less attractive. Nonetheless, stabilizing the financial system, from the financial 
regulator’s perspective, far outweighs this shift in the institutional prime MMFs' assets. 
B- Liquidity fees and redemption gates 
Another significant change to the MMFs regulation is the introduction of liquidity fees and 
redemption gates. A redemption gate is a temporary measure that may be implemented by an 
MMF’s board of directors that restricts redemptions in an MMF for up to 10 business days in 
a 90-day period, if the fund’s weekly liquid assets fall below 30% of its total assets.89 The 
board of directors can also impose liquidity fees up to 2%, if the fund’s weekly liquid assets 
fall below 30% of its total assets and the board determines that this measure is in the 
investors’ best interest.90 Nonetheless, an MMF is required to impose a liquidity fee of 1% on 
all redemptions if its weekly liquid assets fall below 10% of its total assets, unless the board 
                                                          
87 See, Committee on Capital Markets Regulation, Comment letter to SEC (2013) available at 
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-03-13/s70313-210.pdf accessed 5 September 2017.  
88 See, Goldman Sachs Asset Management, US Money Market Reform by the Numbers (January 2017) available 
at https://www.gsam.com/content/gsam/us/en/advisors/market-insights/gsam-insights/2017/us-money-
market-reform-by-the-numbers.html accessed 4 September 2017.    
89  See, SEC, ‘Money Market Fund Reform; Amendments to Form PF’ (2014) at 39.  
90 Ibid, at 40.  
25 
 
of directors of the fund determines that imposing such a fee would not be in the best interests 
of the fund.91 Rule 2a-7 already provided boards with the ability to suspend redemptions, 
after SEC approval, provided an MMF would need to be liquidated. 
The SEC rationale for imposing liquidity fees is to mitigate the first mover advantage through 
increasing the cost of shares' redemptions.92 Unlike liquidity fees, redemption gates are 
designed to directly stop a run in times of heavy redemptions. In other words, redemption 
gates restriction aims at providing the MMF’s board of directors with an immediate tool to 
stop heavy redemptions in times of stress.    
The shareholders’ right to redeem their shares at any time is a key feature that attracts 
investors to invest in MMFs. By imposing liquidity fees and redemption gates, shareholders 
will be prevented from accessing their funds, so these restrictions would influence the 
investors’ investment decision to invest in MMFs. Liquidity fees and redemption gates are 
discretionary tools; thus the board of directors might decide not to use them even though the 
fund's assets fall below 30%. This raises an important question: why might the board of 
director hesitate to impose these restrictions? Imposing a gate or fee would damage the 
MMF’s reputation and shareholders who have been subjected to a gate or fee are likely to 
leave the fund. Prospective investors will also be careful of investing in an MMF that has 
previously imposed these restrictions. Therefore, the MMFs’ ability to attract investors will 
be limited due to the market competition conditions. These considerations would be likely to 
impact the board of directors’ decision and determine that protecting the interest of the 
investors requires them not to impose any restrictions. Even in cases of when the fund assets 
fall below 10% the board still has the same power under the concept of the investors’ best 
interest. By emphasizing on the concept of “best interests”, the SEC has placed a large 
responsibility on the board of directors. However, the SEC did not provide meaningful 
guidance on the concept “best interests” and how funds’ boards should exercise this 
discretion to protect investors, and that might minimize the effectiveness of these tools. The 
SEC, for example, indicated a number of factors a board might consider in determining the 
fund’s best interests. These may include, but are not limited to: the relevant indicators of 
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liquidity stress in the markets, the liquidity profile of the fund and expectations as to how the 
profile might change in the immediate future, and the fund’s experience.93 
In addition, the question that can be raised here is: can fees and gates restrictions diminish 
MMFs investors’ incentive to runs? When investors are aware that they should pay the cost 
of their redemption requests, this could encourage them to remain invested in the funds to 
avoid the exit cost. This, however, could be counterproductive. Since MMFs' investors know 
that MMF can impose fees and gates, any deterioration or slight stress in the financial market 
might incentivise them to redeem their shares before the fund applies these tools. Further, 
when other MMFs' shareholders know that an MMF has imposed fees or gate they might run 
to redeem their shares on concerns that their MMFs could take the same measures. In other 
words, rather than diminishing MMFs' incentive to run, fees and gates might increase 
vulnerability of MMFs to run. As a result, the law should be clear in this regard and remove 
any ambiguity that might undermine the effectiveness of these tools. 
 C- Disclosure and reporting      
With an extensive list of additional required disclosures, the 2014 reform requires MMFs to 
reflect in their disclosure the structural changes in the MMFs industry. The new disclosure 
rules are designed to make MMFs' levels of liquidity, redemption requests, potential 
imposition of liquidity fees or redemption gates, and NAV more transparent in order to 
enable investors to play an effective role in supervising and monitoring the fund activities. In 
particular, MMFs are required to disclose a market-based NAV each business day.94 As for 
FNAV MMFs, the market-based NAV is the issue and redemption price; whereas in SNAV 
MMFs, it is a shadow NAV.95    
Further, in order to make FNAV MMFs investors aware of the consequences of the new 
changes, MMFs must disclose that investors could lose money by investing in the fund due to 
the market fluctuation and an MMF may impose redemption fees and/or temporary suspend 
redemption.96  
Under the 2010 amendments, the SEC imposed an obligation on MMFs to have websites. The 
2014 amendments adopted further website disclosure requirements for MMFs. In order to 
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promote transparency and boost market discipline in the management of MMFs, funds are 
required to show key information on their websites on each business day. MMFs, for 
example, should show: (1) the MMF’s current NAV; (2) the percentage of total assets 
invested in daily and weekly liquid assets; and (3) daily net inflows or outflows.97  
Another significant change to the disclosure requirements is the introduction of form N-CR. 
MMFs must file a report with the SEC upon the occurrence of certain significant events. The 
report must be sent to the SEC within one business day of the event’s occurrence, and a 
follow-up filing must be sent within four business days, including a clear description of the 
event.98 The SEC will make the information contained in Form N-CR publicly available upon 
filing. 
These disclosure amendments may provide valuable transparency to investors because they 
will permit current and prospective shareholders to make informed decisions to purchase 
shares of, or remain invested in, the fund. Nonetheless, extensive disclosure may overwhelm 
investors by limiting their ability to determine useful information related to their investments. 
Extensive disclosure may be useful for institutional investors that have competent staff who 
are able to analyse the information and make informed decisions based on the disclosed 
information. Nevertheless, information overload might be problematic to retail investors 
because these investors do not usually have the ability to understand technical and 
sophisticated information. Therefore, too much information might be confusing rather than 
useful to these investors. Here, it is significant to emphasise that, as will be discussed later, 
the SEC knows that the fundamental changes in the MMFs industry will make these vehicles 
more attractive to institutional and sophisticated investors than retail investors.    
D- Stress testing 
One of the significant reforms addressed in the 2014 is the enhanced stress testing 
requirement. In 2010, the SEC imposed an obligation on MMFs to periodically test their 
ability to maintain a SNAV based on certain hypothetical events.99 Nonetheless, the 
disparities in the effectiveness and quality of stress testing practices among MMFs 
demonstrated the need to enhance the 2010 rules. The 2014 reform requires MMF to apply 
prescriptive stress testing system. Particularly, MMFs must test their ability to maintain 
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weekly liquid assets of at least 10% of total assets in response to several scenarios.100 The 
hypothetical stress events include: (1) increases in the level of short term interest rates; (2) a 
downgrade or default of particular portfolio security positions; and (3) a widening of spreads 
compared to the indexes to which portfolio securities are tied.101 An MMF's adviser must 
report the results of the stress testing to the board to evaluate the results of the stress testing. 
Considering stress testing as a significant tool to achieve stability of the MMFs, the new rules 
aim to minimize the possibility of a failure by requiring MMFs to test their liquidity position 
in case of adverse economic developments or heavy redemption requests. It is significant to 
mention that stress testing is a critical element of risk management for banks and a 
fundamental tool for banking supervisors and macro-prudential authorities. Stress-testing 
may be the most effective method to ensure the resilience of the financial system. Pillar 1, 
minimum capital requirements, of the Basel II framework requires banks to have in place a 
rigorous programme of stress testing because stress testing alerts bank management to a 
variety of risks.102 Therefore, the emphasis on this tool in the MMFs' reforms can be 
attributed to its effectiveness in the banking industry, and this is a clear proof of the influence 
of the banking regulators on the MMFs' reforms. 
4.2 Reforms in the EU Regulatory Regime 
The adverse impacts of the 2008 financial crisis on the European MMF industry underlined 
the need to reform the MMF legal framework. Prior to the new reform, around 80% of MMF 
assets were covered by the rules of Directive 2009/65/EC on Undertakings for Collective 
Investment in Transferable Securities (UCITS).103 The remaining MMFs operated under the 
rules of Directive 2011/61/EU, covering 'Alternative Investment Fund Managers' (AIFM). 
The UCITS Directive regulates marketing collective investment schemes throughout 
Europe.104 This means that UCITS Directive does not target MMFS specifically. In 2010, the 
Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR), European Securities and Markets 
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Authority's predecessor, published guidelines on the common definition of European 
MMFs.105 The Guidelines codified particular management and operational rules deemed 
suitable for European MMFs.   
For the purpose of preserving the integrity and stability of the European financial markets, a 
proposal for a regulation on MMFs was published by the European Commission in 
September 2013.106 After much delay and long debate and consultations, the new European 
MMFs regulation was published in the EU Official Journal on 30 June 2017. The Regulation 
came into force on 21 July 2017. Existing MMFs will have to comply with the new 
regulation by 21 January 2019. 
The length of time it took to reach the final agreement, around four years, suggests that the 
new MMFs' regulation is one of the most contentious and complex pieces of legislation that 
the EU regulators have dealt with. The apparent consequences of the 2014 reform in the US 
on the MMF industry, especially the shift in MMFs assets, might be a major reason for this 
delay. To illustrate, the EU regulators aimed at achieving a balanced agreement between 
addressing the vulnerabilities of money market funds and their potential systemic risk, and 
maintaining the intrinsic value of these short-term financial instruments to businesses in the 
European financial markets.  
Generally, the new EU reform appears to follow the US reform in terms of the mechanisms 
adopted to address MMFs' vulnerability to run, namely liquidity fees and redemption gates, 
transparency and stress testing. Nonetheless, the major difference between the two reforms is 
the EU reform provides investors with a high degree of optionality for investing their short-
term cash. To maintain MMFs as a viable product, the new regulation offers two types of 
MMF and three structural options. According to the new regulation, MMFs must be classified 
as either a short-term MMF or a standard MMF.107 On the one hand, short-term MMFs aim to 
offer money market rate returns with a maximum weighted average maturity (WAM) of 60 
days and maximum weighted average life (WAL) of 120 days. With short WAM and WAL, 
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short-term MMFs seek to provide investors with the highest possible level of safety.108 On 
the other hand, standard MMFs are created with the objective of offering returns slightly 
higher than short-term money market returns.109 Therefore, standard MMFs are required to 
have a maximum WAM of six months and maximum WAL of one year.  
MMFs, under the new reform, may be structured as Public Debt CNAV MMFs, Low 
Volatility NAV (LVNAV) MMFs or VNAV MMFs.110 The reform has introduced LVNAV 
MMF as an innovative product to attract more investors and avoid shifting MMFs assets. The 
LVNAV MMF will effectively operate as a CNAV fund by applying amortized costs to 
money market instruments with a remaining maturity below 75 days, as long as the difference 
between such amortized cost and the market price of the instrument remain below 10 points 
and as long as the market NAV of the fund does not deviate from the dealing NAV by more 
than 20 basis points.111 This means that money market instruments with a remaining maturity 
of more than 75 days must be valued using mark-to-market (or mark-to-model) valuations. 
To fulfil potential redemption requests, LVNAV MMFs must comply with strict daily and 
weekly liquidity requirements. They must hold at least 10% in daily liquid assets and at least 
30% in weekly liquid assets.112 In contrast to LVNAV MMF, VNAV MMFs are required to 
hold at least 7.5% of their assets in daily liquid assets and to hold at least 15% of their assets 
in weekly liquid assets. 
In addition, similar to the 2014 reform in the US, the EU reform has introduced a stringent 
regime of fees and gates in the case of shortfalls in the MMF liquidity in order to diminish 
MMFs investors’ incentive to runs. Nevertheless, the liquidity fee and redemption gate 
structure under the EU regulation will not be the same as for the US reform. To illustrate, 
under the EU regulation, liquidity gates and redemption fees apply to public debt CNAVs 
MMFs and LVNAV MMFs only; they do not apply to VNAVs MMFs.113 In contrast, in the 
US, the redemption fees and liquidity gates apply only to institutional prime VNAV MMFs 
and retail MMFs. The restrictions do not apply to government CNAV MMFs, but they may 
opt into them if properly disclosed. 
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The EU regulation distinguishes between mandatory and discretionary application of liquidity 
fees and redemption gates. The discretionary application occurs when the level of weekly 
liquid assets falls below 30% and net redemptions from the MMF exceed 10% in one day. In 
this case, an MMF may apply a liquidity fee to redeeming investors, equal to the cost of 
liquidity or impose redemptions gate up to 10% per day for up to 15 days. The MMF may 
also suspend shares redemptions for up to 15 days.  If the level of weekly liquid assets falls 
below 10%, an MMF has two options: either apply a liquidity fee to redeeming investors, 
equal to the cost of liquidity, or suspend redemptions for up to 15 days.  
As explained above, in the US, the board of directors could avoid applying the mandatory 
liquidity fee (1%) in case of determining that imposing such a fee will not be in the best 
interests of the fund. Unlike the US, the EU regulation does not grant MMFs this power. The 
strictness of the EU regime clearly appears in the consequences of applying the suspension of 
redemption tool. When the total duration of the suspensions exceeds 15 days within a period 
of 90 days, public debt CNAV MMF or a LVNAV MMF shall automatically cease to be a 
public debt CNAV MMF or a LVNAV MMF. This implies that MMFs may prefer to apply 
the liquidity fee to avoid the rigid consequences of the suspension of redemption. By 
imposing strict rules, the EU regulators attempted to avoid the criticisms of the US reform 
regarding the discretionary power of the board of directors to impose liquidity fees and 
redemption gates. However, the mandatory application of the fees and gate could affect the 
attractiveness of MMFs as bank equivalents, where shareholders can access their funds 
anytime.  
Similar to the US 2014 reform, the EU regulation requires MMFs to have in place sound 
stress testing processes based on hypothetical scenarios. Under the new rules, stress tests 
should be conducted regularly, at least bi-annually, and include factors such as credit risk, 
movements in the interest rate, hypothetical redemption requests and changes in liquidity.114 
The purpose of the stress test is to detect any potential vulnerability. In case any vulnerability 
is revealed, the manager of an MMF should submit an extensive report with the results of the 
stress testing and a proposed action plan to the board of directors.115 The board of directors 
has the authority to amend the proposed plan. The board of directors shall send the extensive 
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report to the national competent authority which in turn shall send it to the European 
Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA).116   
Prohibition of External support    
A significant component that distinguishes the EU reform from the US 2014 reform is the 
prohibition of the external (sponsor) support. Article 35 of the MMF regulation prohibits all 
forms of external support to MMFs.117 The debate over the external support has been pivotal 
in the MMF industry whether in the EU or the US.118 Sponsor support refers to the financial 
support provided by an affiliated or parent company of the MMF’s manager. The debate is 
based on the significant role played by sponsors for MMFs that faced substantial redemptions 
requests, especially during the financial crisis. According to Moody's, at least 146 MMFs 
received sponsor support prior to 2007.119 Further, between 2007 and 2009, 62 MMFs, 
including at least 36 funds in the US and an estimated 26 funds in Europe, received financial 
from their sponsors.120 These figures demonstrate the vital role historically played by MMFs' 
sponsors. 
The figures raise an important question about the motivations of the MMFs' sponsors to 
provide financial support to MMFs. It is significant to know that sponsor support is 
completely discretionary. To illustrate, a sponsor is not legally or contractually under an 
obligation to support its MMF in times of financial stress. As noted above, a sponsor is 
usually an affiliated or parent company of the MMF’s manager. This implies that sponsors 
have an interest in providing support to MMFs such as an economic interest in the MMF’s 
management company. Sponsors could also provide support to MMFs to avoid any 
reputational damage to the management company that could be caused by the failure of an 
MMF. The support provided to MMFs could take various forms such as cash injections, fee 
waivers, purchase of MMF's assets at an inflated price, purchase of MMF's shares to provide 
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liquidity and the issuance of any kind of explicit or implicit guarantee for the benefit of the 
MMF.121 
Despite the importance of the sponsor support, the EU financial regulators have decided to 
prohibit it completely. This prohibition could mainly be attributed to the discretionary nature 
of sponsor support. Discretionary sponsor support is often described as a weakness of MMFs 
because the failure of the sponsor to provide support in time of crisis to its MMF would result 
in the failure of the fund itself.122 That uncertainty associated with sponsor support is likely to 
make MMFs more vulnerable to runs during periods of financial instability. 
In the US, the 2014 reform has not modified the ability of an MMF sponsor to support the 
MMF's operations. Nonetheless, it requires additional disclosure with respect to such support. 
An MMF must provide disclosure in its statement of additional information (SAI) regarding 
any occasion during the last 10 years on which the MMF received financial support from a 
sponsor.123 Further, an MMF must report instances of financial support by sponsors on Part C 
of Form N-CR, including amount, nature, terms of the support, and the relationship between 
the person providing the support and the MMF.124 The SEC also requires an MMF to disclose 
on its website any support received by its sponsor. Clearly, the US financial regulators took a 
different approach from the EU regulators. Considering the significant role of sponsor 
support in the history of MMF industry especially during the financial crisis, the SEC 
preserved the sponsor support as a potential instrument that MMFs might use, but with 
extensive disclosure requirements to ensure transparency to shareholders. By imposing these 
disclosure requirements, the SEC attempts to achieve two objectives; (1) to make investors 
aware that sponsor support is entirely discretionary; and (2) to keep the SEC informed of all 
instances of sponsor support, and that will help the SEC to analyse the economic effects of 
such sponsor financial support.  
The disparity in the EU and the US approaches to sponsor support accentuates the necessity 
of harmonization of the international legal framework of the MMF industry because this 
disparity carries a threat to the stability of the global financial system, and the 2008 financial 
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crisis is a clear proof of the impact of instability of a financial market on other financial 
markets.     
5. Analysing MMF’s Reforms from financial stability perspective 
In order to understand the rationale for the major changes to MMF regulations in the EU and 
the US and their implications, it is necessary to understand the changes to the financial 
regulations objectives and structure post the 2008 financial crisis. The main failures in the 
financial regulation and supervision were intrinsic causes of the crisis.125In particular, the 
financial crisis of 2008 showed many deficiencies in the pre-crisis approach to financial 
stability regulation. The social and economic costs of the crisis demonstrated that the theory 
of the self-correcting nature of the capital markets is not anymore adequate.126 To illustrate, 
in the self-correction process, the market price either increases or decreases in response to a 
deficiency or an excess to restore the balance between quantity demanded and quantity 
supplied.127 This process works automatically to adjust from disequilibrium to equilibrium 
without the need for government intervention to regulate the market. However, the collapse 
of the financial system in 2008 proved that this assumption is false. As a result, the 
enhancement of financial regulation was placed as a core position to strengthen financial 
markets and regulatory regimes and to avoid future crises. Considerably, since the financial 
crisis, the goal of financial stability has become the dominant idea of any financial reform 
nationally or internationally. In the US, as discussed above, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act ("Dodd-Frank") was passed in 2010 as a response to 
the 2008 financial crisis. The preamble to Dodd-Frank defines it as an Act designed "to 
promote the financial stability of the United States".128 
Prior to the 2008 financial crisis, the assumption that the resilience of individual financial 
institutions is both an essential and sufficient condition to secure the resilience of the whole 
financial system was erroneous because events during the crisis have demonstrated that the 
resilience of individual institutions is an inadequate way of avoiding instability in the 
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financial system. 129 Micro-prudential rules failed to consider the impacts of individual 
financial institutions' risk-taking on the broader financial system and economy,130 and how 
the interconnectedness of financial institutions could increase systemic risks across the 
financial system.131 Therefore, to achieve the financial stability objective, it was necessary to 
focus on the resilience and robustness of the financial system as a whole. To illustrate, due to 
complexity of the financial system, actions that might be suitable for individual financial 
institutions can cause destabilization to the financial system as a whole. Consequently, any 
reform to individual institutions needs to be complemented by a system-wide perspective. 
This holistic approach adopted by many financial regulators is called macro-prudential 
policy. While the most important objective of macro-prudential and micro-prudential is to 
mitigate risk, macro-prudential policies aim at identifying and mitigating potential risks to 
systemic stability.132 Early and efficient diagnosis of wide systemic risks is vital for macro-
prudential policymaking because early identification of potential risks could help rapid use of 
policy tools to address these risks.133  
In addition, macro-prudential policy uses a range of tools to achieve its objectives because 
applying a single tool is unlikely to be sufficient to address the various sources of systemic 
risk. This can include mandatory capital buffers, stress tests, liquidity fees and suspension of 
redemption. Stress tests play a significant role in assessing the vulnerability of the financial 
system to adverse shocks.134 Mandatory capital buffers are another important tool that macro-
prudential authorities can use to address specific vulnerabilities. 135 These require financial 
institutions, in addition to minimum capital requirements, to maintain higher capital to asset 
ratios to ensure that they continue to operate in the event of adverse shocks in the financial 
markets without the need to shrink assets. 136 
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The process of rebuilding stability of the financial system, therefore, should be 
comprehensive and attempt to improve the resilience of each individual institution to adverse 
shocks. Since the risks to financial stability can originate in the banking sector and in other 
parts of the financial system, the international regulatory reform agenda has focused on 
making banks safer by boosting their capital and introducing specific regulatory liquidity 
ratios. The regulatory reform has also concentrated on some non-bank institutions and 
shadow banking activities. In the banking sector, the Basel Committee issued in December 
2010 the Basel III rules text, which provides the details of global regulatory standards on 
bank capital adequacy and liquidity. The new rules set out higher quality capital, the 
introduction of a leverage ratio as a backstop to the risk-based requirement better risk 
coverage, and measures to foster the build-up of capital that can be drawn down in times of 
stress.137  
As discussed earlier, while MMFs did not cause the financial crisis, any shocks impacting the 
MMF industry can quickly have broader, systemic consequences due to their pivotal role in 
short-term funding markets and their interconnectedness with banks. Hence, imposing strict 
standards in terms of maturity of underlying securities and the credit quality, and higher 
disclosure requirements was inevitable to avoid leaving any gap in the financial stability 
policy. The major impediment that hampered the progress of MMF reforms, whether in the 
US or the EU, was the careful balance that needs to be struck between preserving the viability 
of MMF as a significant tool of finance in the financial market and addressing MMFs 
vulnerabilities to run, which could be a main source of instability of the financial system 
during the times of market stress. For this reason, the debate about the final form of the 
reform in the EU and the US was intense. Nonetheless, since the stability of the financial 
system is a pre-condition to any reform after the global financial crisis, the financial 
regulators have chosen to impose strict rules on MMF despite the fact that they are likely to 
jeopardize the viability of some types of MMFs in the long run. This raises a significant 
question about the impacts of the reforms on the MMF industry. In the US, statistics revealed 
by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) show a noticeable decline in the number 
of MMFs from 2014 to 2017. In July 2014 the number of MMFs was 553 and this number 
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decreased to 382 in November 2017.138 The statistics also show a massive shift in prime 
MMFs' assets. The assets under management in prime funds dropped sharply from 
$1,710,127 million in July 2014 to $679,795 million in November 2017.139 These statistics 
demonstrate the decrease in the attractiveness of MMFs. Because the drop in the MMFs' 
assets is an inevitable consequence of the substantial changes to this industry, the SEC has 
not made any intervention to stop it. 
In fact, one of the main reasons that attracts investors to invest in MMFs is the analogous 
features that make MMFs equivalents to bank deposits: instantaneous access to the liquidity 
and stability of the value of the capital invested. Even if the possibility of imposing 
redemption gate or liquidity fees appears unlikely to occur in normal circumstances, it could 
influence the investors’ decision to invest in MMFs or force the existing investors to exit 
from MMFs because some investors will not be willing to undertake this risk no matter how 
remote it may seem. These outflows could be disruptive to financial markets. It is important 
to emphasise that the investors’ ability to access their funds on any regular business day 
without disruptions is fundamental to some investors in choosing the appropriate investment.     
Another important point is that investors who invest in institutional prime MMF, which are 
required to float their NAV under the new reforms, may also need to re-consider their 
investment decisions because -in specific circumstances- MMFs might not be classified as 
cash equivalents. To illustrate, when there is a significant change in the fund NAV or the 
fund imposes a liquidity fee or a redemption gate, the investment in that fund may not be cash 
equivalents because the shares are not convertible to known amounts of cash. That will only 
be problematic in exceptional circumstances and in normal circumstances, MMFs are still 
classified as cash equivalent because the fluctuations in the NAV will be insignificant. 
Further, the complexity of the new regulation, in the EU and the US, has made MMFs more 
appropriate investments for institutional investors than retail investors. Understanding the 
circumstances under which MMFs are able to impose liquidity fees or redemption gates 
might be difficult to retail investors because they do not have financial or legal knowledge 
that enables them to make informed decisions. Although the EU reform attempts to attract 
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more investors, retail and institutional, by introducing LVNAV MMF, the requirements under 
which they can operate as CNAV MMF are complicated for retail investors to understand and 
the possibility that LVNAV MMF could operate as FNAV MMF, in case of noncompliance 
with strict rules, might discourage them to invest in this new type. In fact, retail investors rely 
on their own analysis to make investment decisions and they usually fail to undertake proper 
research before making their investment decisions. In other words, in most of the situations 
their decisions are based on information received from others. On the other hand, institutional 
investors rely heavily on research backed data to make their investments.140 They usually 
have investment research teams, who have extensive access to research data and they are able 
to predict potential changes in the market or the fund circumstances. As a result, institutional 
investors are sophisticated enough to understand the complexity of the new reforms and 
choose appropriate MMFs that conform with their investment policies. Their sophistication 
allows them to respond promptly to any changes in the fund circumstances, which could 
result in applying liquidity fee or redemption gate. 
Based on the above analysis, it is clear that the US and EU MMF regulatory reforms are 
indispensable and fall within a wider financial regulatory plan that prioritise the stability of 
the financial system. Although financial regulators, in both jurisdictions, realize that the 
reforms would have some serious consequences on the MMFs industry, they are assured that 
the reforms will substantially strengthen financial stability. 
6. Conclusion  
This article has examined the MMF reforms in the EU and the US and their implication on 
the MMF industry and investors from the perspective of financial stability. Addressing 
MMFs' systemic risk and vulnerability to run is a fundamental step in achieving financial 
stability, which is the dominant objective of all financial reforms after the 2008 financial 
crisis. Although the new strict rules represent a major change to the MMF industry in terms 
of their operation and structure, they diminish the systemic risks associated with runs on 
MMFs. Nonetheless, the article has clearly demonstrated that the new rules have drastic 
consequences for some types of MMFs, especially in terms of the huge shift of assets from 
some types to others or to other industries. 
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In the US, the requirement for institutional prime and municipal money market funds to float 
their NAV, along with the introduction of fees and gates, aimed at alleviating the investors' 
incentive to redeem their shares ahead of others. However, the article has raised two issues 
regarding the US reform. The first issue is the concepts of "best interests" and "discretion" in 
decision-making given to the board of directors in determining of imposition of fees and 
gates. The 2014 reform or the SEC did not provide any guidance on the concept “best 
interests” and how MMFs’ boards would exercise this discretion to protect investors. 
Therefore, to ensure the effectiveness of these tools and provide investors with high level of 
protection, the SEC should provide clear guidance on the concept of “best interests". The 
second issue is related to the sponsor support. The 2014 reform emphasised the importance of 
sponsor support by allowing third party sponsors to financially support MMFs. However, the 
discretionary nature of sponsor support represents a fragility in the new reform and makes 
MMFs vulnerable to runs during periods of financial instability. Thus, it is desirable to make 
the sponsor support explicit by making sponsors committed to maintain $1 or to any form of 
financial support. It is also desirable to clearly specify support mechanisms, so investors can 
be aware of them.     
In the EU, the new reform appears to follow the US reform in applying similar mechanisms 
to address MMFs vulnerabilities to run, but with variation in their application. The article 
emphasised that the introduction of LVNAV MMFs aims at avoiding the consequences of the 
US reforms, especially assets shifts. However, the optionality introduced by the reform has 
made MMF regulation so complex not only to the investors, but also to the funds' managers. 
Unlike the US reform, the EU new regulation prohibits all forms of sponsor support due to its 
uncertainty. This raises a significant issue about the importance of harmonization of MMFs 
regulations due to interconnection of the US and EU financial markets. In fact, any gap in the 
regulations will inevitably threaten the stability of the global financial system.  
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